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The thesis of this article is that legal, as distinguished from equita-
ble, future interests in land, as presently permitted and enforced in
the United States, prevent the use of land in the manner most suited
to current economic and social needs, to the detriment of the owners
of present and future interests in the land and of the community. This
thesis will be developed by the presentation of an example involving
the four varieties of legal future interests which cause the most trou-
ble-the possibility of reverter, the right of entry on breach of condi-
tion subsequent, the contingent remainder and the executory inter-
est-followed by discussions of the problems created by each and
descriptions of some solutions which have been attempted. A modest
proposal for ameliorating the situation will then be presented with
hesitation and in the hope that some reader will propose a better
solution to the evils of legal future interests.
THE TYPE EXAMPLE: ASHLAND IN FETTERS'
At the beginning of 1860 Abraham Clay owned, in fee simple
absolute, two hundred acres of farm and woodland located about a
mile northwest of the village of Clayton, in Clay County, near the
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I. This caption is borrowed from the title of Lord Justice Sir Thomas Edward Scrutton's
notable essay, LAND IN FETTERS (1886), which, by describing their evil effects, helped to bring
about the English statutory abolition of legal future interests.
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western border of the state.' This tract was, and still is, known as
"Ashland." During 1860 Abraham Clay executed three conveyances.
The first conveyed a right of way over the easterly five rods of Ash-
land to the Columbia, Clayton and Maryville Railroad Company, its
successors and assigns, "so long as used for railroad purposes." The
second conveyed the northwesterly acre of Ashland to trustees for
Oak Grove Church, their heirs and assigns, "so long as church serv-
ices are conducted there at least weekly." The third conveyed the
southwesterly acre of Ashland to the Clay County Rural School
District and its successors, "but if the land conveyed shall cease to
be used for public school purposes, the grantor or his heirs may re-
enter and terminate the estate hereby conveyed."
Abraham Clay died in 1870, leaving a will by which he devised
all of his estates and interests in lands in Clay County to his eldest
son, Isaac; Isaac Clay died in 1900, leaving a will by which he devised
all of his estates and interests in lands in Clay County to his eldest
son, Jacob. Jacob Clay died in 1930, leaving a will by which he
devised all of his estates and interests in lands in Clay County to his
eldest son, Reuben. Reuben Clay died early in 1960, survived by his
four sons: Hanoch, a bachelor aged forty; Phallu, a bachelor aged
thirty-eight; Hesron, a married man aged thirty-six with four chil-
dren; and Charmi, a married but childless man aged thirty-four. By
his will, which was duly admitted to probate, Reuben Clay devised
all of his estates and interests in lands in Clay County to
my eldest son, Hanoch Clay, for and during the full term of his natural life,
remainder, if he dies survived by issue, to his issue per stirpes in fee simple
absolute and, if he dies without issue him surviving, to my second son, Phallu
Clay and his heirs; but if both my said sons shall die without issue them
surviving, the said estates and interests shall pass, upon the death of the
survivor of them, to the issue then living of my third son, Hesron Clay, per
stirpes in fee simple, subject to a charge in the amount of $10,000 in favor of
my fourth son, Charmi Clay, if he is then living, or in favor of his issue per
stirpes, if he is then dead and issue of his survives.
In 1969 the Columbia, Clayton and Maryville Railroad Company
stopped using the right of way over Ashland for railroad purposes.
In 1970 Oak Grove Church ceased to conduct services and its mem-
bers joined the Truett Memorial Church in downtown Clayton. In
1971 the Clay County Rural School District ceased using the
southwesterly acre of Ashland for public school purposes and began
2. The state is Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri or North Carolina, as the
reader prefers.
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busing children to the consolidated school in Clayton. Recent estab-
lishment of industry in Clayton has changed it from a sleepy country
village to a booming, expanding city.
In April, 1972 the President of the Clayton Chamber of Com-
merce, the Chairman of the City Planning Commission and the Gen-
eral Manager of Clayton Promoters, Inc. held a conference with
Hanoch, Phallu, Hesron and Charmi Clay. The Clay brothers were
told that Clayton is in urgent need of a new residential subdivision
and shopping center complex; that Ashland is the ideal site for it; that
Clayton Promoters, Inc. will pay them $10,000 an acre for Ashland
if they can furnish merchantable title to the entire two hundred acres
by October 1, 1972; and that the city's expansion will be onto less
suitable sites southeast of the present city if the Clay brothers cannot
furnish merchantable title by that date. The Clay brothers, who are
on excellent terms with each other, are anxious to accept this offer
of two million dollars for Ashland. Can they furnish merchantable
title to Ashland by October 1, 1972? If they cannot, the expansion of
Clayton will be to the southeast, to the detriment of both the Clay
family and the community.
The Former Railroad Right of Way
Whether it was a possessory estate in fee simple determinable or
a mere determinable easement of right of way, the interest of the
Columbia, Clayton and Maryville Railroad Company in Ashland has
terminated; nevertheless, present ownership of the five-rod strip along
the easterly edge of the tract may be dependent upon the classifica-
tion of the railroad company's expired interest. If the railroad com-
pany had a possessory estate in fee simple determinable from 1860
until 1969, the interest retained by Abraham Clay after his 1860
conveyance to the railroad was a possibility of reverter which may
not have q3een devised effectively either by his will or the wills of
Isaac, Jacob and Reuben Clay.3 If, on the other hand, the railroad
had only an easement of right of way, Abraham Clay retained seisin
of the present estate in fee simple, subject to the easement, and this
present estate in fee simple unquestionably passed under his will and
those of Isaac, Jacob and Reuben Clay.4
From a very early period, the English common law of servitudes
3. See notes 8-30 infra and accompanying text.
4. E. WASHBURN, EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 228-29 (3d ed. 1873).
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recognized a non-exclusive right of passage over land in the posses-
sion and control of another as an easement of right of way which
could be acquired by prescription or grant.' A right of passage entitl-
ing the holder to exclusive possession and control of the surface over
which it extended was not deemed a servitude under the English
common law, but rather was considered a possessory estate. In this
country, however, a deed conveying a "right of way" over land to a
railroad is usually held to give the railroad only aneasement, leaving
seisin of the present fee simple in the grantor.' This being so, the
easterly five rods of Ashland passed under the wills of Abraham,
Isaac, Jacob, and Reuben Clay, and its present ownership is now the
same as that of the portions of Ashland which were not affected by
the conveyances made by Abraham Clay in 1860.
The Possibility of Reverter in the Oak Grove Church Site
The interest in the northwesterly acre of Ashland conveyed to the
trustees of the Oak Grove Church by the 1860 deed was an estate in
fee simple determinable which terminated automatically when church
services ceased to be conducted there in 1970. The deed left a possibil-
ity of reverter in Abraham Clay which became a possessory estate
when the estate in fee simple determinable expired.8 But who owned
the possibility of reverter in 1970?
At common law, contingent future interests, including contingent
remainders, executory interests, possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry on breach of condition subsequent, could not be conveyed inter
vivos or devised by will The Statute of Wills of 1540 permitted
devise by will of "manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any
5. Collicum v. Tucker, 2 Bulst. 121, 80 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1613); Alban v. Brounsall, Yelv.
163, 80 Eng. Rep. 109 (1609).
6. Rex v. Bell, 7 T.R. 598, 101 Eng. Rep. 1152 (1798); Reilly v. Booth, 44 Ch. D. 12 (C.A.
1890); Metropolitan Ry. v. Fowler, [1893] A.C. 416.
7. Browne v. Weare, 348 Mo. 135, 152 S.W.2d 649 (1941); University City v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry., 347 Mo. 814, 149 S.W.2d 321 (1941); St. Louis County v. Delbet Inv. Co., 469
S.W.2d 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Beasley v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 145 N.C. 272, 59
S.E. 60 (1907); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Olive, 142 N.C. 257, 55 S.E. 263 (1906); Hodges
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N.C. 225, 45 S.E. 572 (1903); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 973, 1013
(1966). Cf SIMES & SMITH § 290 (Supp. 1972).
8. Donehue v. Nilges, 364 Mo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553 (1954); Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C.
13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950); 2 BLACKSTONE *155; SIMES & SMITH §§ 282, 293; RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 44.
9. 2 BLACKSTONE * 290, 374. With exception under the custom of Kent and some towns,
even present estates and vested remainders in fee simple were not devisable by will at common
law. Id. at * 311, 314, 348, 361, 374.
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of them."'0 The statute enacted two years later to explain the 1540
Act permitted devise by will of an "estate or interest in fee-simple,
: . . in any manors, lands, tenements, rents, or other hereditaments,
in possession, reversion, remainder, or of rents or services incident
to any reversion or remainder."" A seventeenth-century lord keeper
held that this legislation did not permit devise of an equitable contin-
gent remainder. 12 In the next century, however, the Court of King's
Bench affirmed a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas holding
that an executory interest was devisable by will. 3 The language of
the opinions in this case was broad enough to suggest that all contin-
gent interests, including contingent remainders, executory interests,
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition
subsequent, were devisable by will. The English Wills Act of 1837
made this clear." An 1845 English statute permitted conveyance of
contingent remainders, executory interests, possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent by deed."
In the absence of express statutory provision, American authority
is fairly evenly split on the question of whether a possibility of rev-
erter is alienable inter vivos.16 As the common law did not recognize
wills of real property, the power to devise possibilities of reverter
must arise, if at all, from statute. In the absence of express statutory
provision, probably a majority of American states have construed
their statutes of wills as permitting devise of a possibility of reverter.17
The Missouri 8 and North Carolina 9 statutes could easily be con-
10. Stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 1 (1540).
11. Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5, § 4 (1542).
12. Bishop v. Fountaine, 3 Lev. 427, 83 Eng. Rep. 764 (1696). The rule in this case was
assumed, but not applied, by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in Ives v. Legge, 3 T.R. 488 n., 100
Eng. Rep. 692 n. (1743). The decision in that case held that the remainder in question was
vested and had been effectively devised.
13. Jones v. Roe ex dem. Perry, 3 T.R. 88, 100 Eng. Rep. 470 (1789).
14. Stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 3 (1837).
15. Real Property Law Amendment Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, § 6 (1845).
16. SIEs & SMITH § 1860. The Restatement of Property favors inter vivos alienability,
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 159, comment a, at 570. There are dicta to the contrary in
Missouri and North Carolina. Polette v. Williams, 456 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. 1970); Blue v.
City of Wilmington, 186 N.C. 321, 323, 119 S.E. 741, 743 (1923). Both states have statutes
permitting conveyance of land by deed in lieu of the livery of seisin required by the common
law for transfer of present freehold estates. VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 442.020 (1952) could
easily be construed to permit conveyance of a possibility of reverter by deed; however, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 47-17 (1966) is not so broad.
17. SIMES & SMITH § 1903; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 165.
18. VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 474.310 (1956).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-40 (1966).
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strued to permit devises of possibilities of reverter. Nevertheless,
there are dicta in both states that a possibility of reverter cannot be
devised by will.0 In 1961 North Carolina enacted legislation ex-
pressly permitting conveyance by deed or will of possibilities of re-
verter,21 but, as the wills of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Reuben Clay
became effective before 1961, this legislation does not assist in ascer-
taining the present ownership of the northwesterly acre of Ashland.
If the possibility of reverter retained by Abraham Clay after the
execution of the 1860 deed was not effectively devised by his will and
those of Isaac, Jacob and Reuben Clay, its ownership in 1970 is
governed by the rules of intestate descent.
Under the English common law, if the first owner of a future
interest in real property died before it became possessory, without
making an effective conveyance or devise of it, the interest descended
to his heir, determined at the time of his death.2 If the heir of the
first owner also died before the future interest became possessory,
without making an effective conveyance or devise of it, the interest
then descended to the heir of the first owner, determined as of the
death of the second owner. Similarly, if the third owner also died
before the future interest became possessory, without making an
effective conveyance or devise of it, it passed at his death to the heir
of the first owner, determined as of the death of the third owner. The
effect of this peculiar rule of descent was that, in the absence of an
effective conveyance or devise by some owner of it, when a future
interest became a possessory estate, it belonged to the person who
was the heir of the first owner, determined at that time, which might
be many years after the death of the first owner.2 3 This peculiar rule
governing the intestate descent of future interests in real property at
common law was abrogated in 1897 by legislation which had the
effect of making future interests descend like possessory estates in fee
20. Methodist Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N.C. 34, 35, 40 S.E. 691, 692 (1902). Cf
Polette v. Williams, 456 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. 1970); Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 21, 59
S.E.2d 205, 212 (1950).
21. Ch. 435 [1961] N.C. Laws 590; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3 (1966).
22. Cunningham v. Moody, I Ves. Sen. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965 (1748); Kinaston v. Clark,
2 Atk. 204, 26 Eng. Rep. 526 (1741); Stringer v. New, 9 Mod. 363, 88 Eng. Rep. 509 (1741).
23. Goodright ex dem. Larmer v. Searle, 2 Wils. K.B. 29, 95 Eng. Rep. 668 (1756); Kellow
v. Rowden, 3 Mod. 253, 87 Eng. Rep. 167 (1689); 2 BLACKSTONE *228 (E. Christian's note 13
to 12th ed., 1794); 2 FEARNE 534-36; 2 R. WOODDESON, SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 255-56 (1792). Cf Jenkins ex dem. Harris v. Prichard, 2 Wils. K.B. 45, 95 Eng.
Rep. 677 (1757).
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simple to the heir of the last owner.24
With respect to reversions, remainders and executory interests,
American courts have been unanimous in rejecting the peculiar com-
mon law rule as to descent of future interests in real property. They
hold that such a future interest, like a present estate in fee simple,
descends on the death of any owner of it intestate to the heirs of the
last owner, determined at the time of his death.25 However, a very few
states, notably North Carolina, still followed in 1960 the peculiar
common law rule of descent in the case of possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry to terminate estates in fee simple on breach of condi-
tion subsequent.2 If the peculiar common law rule governs, the
northwesterly acre of Ashland is now owned by the heirs of Abraham
Clay, determined as if he had died in 1970, a century after his actual
death. If the prevailing modern rule governs, the possibility of re-
verter descended on the death of Abraham Clay in 1870 to his heirs,
determined at that time. On the later death of an heir of Abraham
Clay-for example, a son-the son's share in the possibility of re-
verter descended to the heirs of the son, determined at the son's death.
Similarly, the share of a grandson who inherited as an heir of the son
passed on the grandson's death to the heirs of the grandson, deter-
mined at the grandson's death.
Under the English common law, the rules of intestate descent of
real property included the doctrine of primogeniture, under which the
eldest son or, if he was dead, his eldest son, was the sole heir.27 If
primogeniture had been in force in Clay County from 1870 through
1960, and the possibility of reverter retained by Abraham Clay
passed exclusively by intestate descent, Hanoch Clay would now own
the northwesterly acre of Ashland in fee simple absolute, whether the
peculiar common law rule of descent of future interests or the prevail-
24. Land Transfer Act, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 65, § 1 (1897).
25. Davidson v. Davidson, 350 Mo. 639, 167 S.W.2d 641 (1943); Wommack v. Whitmore,
58 Mo. 448 (1874); Early v. Early, 134 N.C. 258, 46 S.E. 503 (1904); SIMES & SMITH § 1883;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 164. Earlier North Carolina cases followed the common law
rule. King v. Scoggin, 92 N.C. 99 (1885); Lawrence v. Pitt, 46 N.C. (I Jones' Law) 344 (1854);
Exum v. Davie, 5 N.C. (I Murphey) 475 (1810).
26. Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950) (possibility of reverter); Methodist
Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N.C. 8, 40 S.E. 691 (1902) (right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent). SIMES & SMITH § 1884. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-(2)(b)(19066) (originally
enacted in the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act, ch. 879, § 1, [1959] N.C. Laws
886)(effective July 1, 1960) adopted the prevailing modern view as to possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry on breach on condition subsequent.
27. 2 BLACKSTONE *212-20.
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ing modern view governed. He was the heir of Abraham Clay, deter-
mined as of 1970. Isaac was the heir of Abraham, determined as of
1870; Jacob was the heir of Isaac, determined as of 1900; Reuben was
the heir of Jacob, determined as of 1930; and Hanoch was the heir
of Reuben, determined as of the latter's death in 1960.
All of the American states abolished primogeniture before 1870
by statutes making all the children of an intestate decedent heirs."8
They have tended to make a surviving spouse a co-heir with the
children of the intestate decedent, but most states have changed the
rights of succession of surviving spouses several times since 1870. In
order to simplify the problem of present ownership of the northwes-
terly acre, let us assume that Abraham Clay had 8 children, 48 grand-
children, and 192 great-grandchildren, all 248 of whom survived their
spouses and died before 1960. This would result in the acre being
owned now by the 384 living great-great-grandchildren of Abraham
Clay, as tenants in common with unequal shares.
How are the title and shares of the 384 owners of this acre to be
established? If the peculiar common law rule of descent of future
interests governs, it may be sufficient to conduct a single judicial
proceeding to determine the heirs of Abraham Clay as of 1970. If the
prevailing modern view as to the descent of future interests governs,
it may be necessary to conduct 249 separate proceedings to determine
the heirs of Abraham Clay and each of his 248 deceased children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. In either event, it will not be
feasible to finance the necessary investigation and litigation if the
average value of the interest of each of the 384 tenants in common is
only $25. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Hanoch, Phallu,
Hesron and Charmi Clay to secure title by adverse possession against
their 380 co-tenants9 and, in any event, it cannot be done before
October 1, 1972. If any of them buys a tax title, he will hold it for
himself and his 383 co-tenants.3 1 Perhaps someone who is not one
of the co-tenants could acquire a beneficial tax title if none of the co-
tenants pays the taxes. Every experienced lawyer will realize that, if
28. E.g.. Mo. Gen. Stat. 1865, c. 129, § 1; N.C. Rev. Code 1855, c. 38, § 1.
29. Collier v. Gault, 234 Mo. 457, 137 S.W. 884 (1911); Golden v. Tyer, 180 Mo. 196, 79
S.W. 143 (1904); Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 561 (1866); Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 272
(1860); Brewer v. Brewer, 238 N.C. 607, 78 S.E.2d 719 (1953); Lee v. Parker, 171 N.C. 144,
88 S.E. 217 (1916); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141 N.C. 210,53 S.E. 870 (1906); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d
5 (1962).
30. Kohle v. Hobson, 215 Mo. 213, 114 S.W. 952 (1908); Smith v. Smith, 150 N.C. 81, 63
S.E. 177 (1908); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1535 (1933); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 874 (1928).
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ownership of the northwesterly acre is dependent upon intestate de-
scent of Abraham Clay's possibility of reverter, the chance of anyone
being able to perfect a merchantable title by October 1, 1972, is
virtually nil.
The Right of Entry Into the Rural School Site
The situation of the southwesterly acre of Ashland is even worse.
It was conveyed in 1860 to Clay County Rural School District in fee
simple upon a condition subsequent entitling the grantor, Abraham
Clay, or his heirs, by way of right of entry or power of termination,
to terminate the fee simple conveyed and revest a fee simple in him-
self or themselves, if the land should cease to be used for public school
purposes. The land ceased to be used for public school purposes in
1971 but the fee simple estate of Clay County Rural School District
has not yet terminated because the owners of the right of entry have
not yet elected to terminate it." To ascertain who those owners are,
it is necessary to go through the same process used with respect to
the northwesterly acre.
As has been seen, rights of entry on breach of condition subse-
quent could not be conveyed inter vivos or devised by will at common
law .3 An English decision of 1789 suggested that devise by will of
rights of entry was permitted by the 1540 Statute of Wills;3 3 they
were expressly made devisable by the English Wills Act of 1837;31
and an English statute of 1845 permitted their conveyance inter vivos
by deed." The weight of American authority is to the effect that a
right of entry on breach of condition subsequent on an estate in fee
simple cannot be transferred inter vivos, at least before the condition
is breached .3 The Missouri decisions suggest that such a right of
31. Ellis v. Kyger, 90 Mo. 600, 3 S.W. 23 (1887); Blue v. City of Wilmington, 186 N.C.
321, 119 S.E. 741 (1923); 2 BLACKSTONE * 155; SIMES & SMITH § 255; RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 24.
32. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. Stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, § 2 (1540) permitted
transfer with the reversion of rights of entry in leases for life or years.
33. Jones v. Roe ex dem. Perry, 3 T.R. 88, 100 Eng. Rep. 470 (1789).
34. Stat. 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 26, § 3 (1837).
35. Real Property Law Amendment Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, § 6 (1845). See also Transfer
of Property Simplification Act, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 76, § 5 (1844).
36. SIMES & SMITH § 1862. Originally, the Restatement adopted a distinctly minority view
that an attempt to transfer a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent destroys it.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 160, comment c, at 577. In 1948, the Restatement changed its
position and stated that such an attempt to transfer would not destroy the right of entry. Id.
§ 160, comment c, at 415 (1948 Supp.).
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entry may be conveyed inter vivos after breach of the condition 7 but
not before;38 North Carolina appears to hold that a right of entry
cannot be transferred inter vivos before or after breach of the condi-
tion, in the absence of express statutory authorization. 9 In the ab-
sence of express statutory provision, probably a majority of Ameri-
can states hold that a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent
on an estate in fee simple can be devised by will;4" there is, however,
dictum in Missouri4, and a decision in North Carolina" that it cannot
be devised absent express statutory permission. A 1961 North Caro-
lina statute permits conveyance of rights of entry by deed or will,
before or after breach.43 This statute would not validate the devises
by Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Reuben Clay of their interests in the
southeasterly acre of Ashland, but it would indicate that the present
owners of the right of entry into that acre could convey their interests
before entry.
If the right of entry on breach of condition subsequent into the
southwesterly acre of Ashland was effectively devised by the wills of
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Reuben Clay, its present ownership, like
37. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Fuhrmeister, 353 Mo. 232, 182 S.W.2d 273 (1944).
38. See Farmer's High School Consol. Dist. v. Parker, 240 Mo. App. 331, 203 S.W.2d 516
(Mo. App. 1947).
39. Blue v. City of Wilmington, 186 N.C. 321, 119 S.E. 741 (1923).
40. SIMES & SMITH § 1903; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 165, comment c, at 618-19.
41. Polette v. Williams, 456 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. 1970). See notes 16, 20 supra. The
interest involved in this case was not strictly a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent
but a reserved power to revoke a springing use, as to which see Grange v. Twing, Bridgman,
0. 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (1665); 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *237a; W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE
OF COMMON ASSURANCES *524-25; 2 BLACKSTONE *335; 1 E. SUGDEN, POWERS * 159, *440-42;
2 id. *30. Such a power may be transferable. How v. Whitfield, I Ventr. 338, 339, 86 Eng. Rep.
218, 219 (1679).
42. Methodist Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N.C. 34, 40 S.E. 691 (1902). Ch. 88 [18441
N.C. Laws 125 (now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-40 (1966)) provided
[A]ny testator, by his will duly executed, may devise, bequeath, or dispose of all real
and personal estate which he shall be entitled to at the time of his death, and which, if
not so devised, bequeathed, or disposed of, would descend or devolve upon his heirs at
law, or upon his executor or administrator; and the power hereby given shall extend to
all contingent, executory, or other future interest in any real or personal estate, whether
the testator may or may not be the person or one of the persons, in whom the same
may become vested, or whether he may be entitled thereto under the instrument by which
the same was created, or under any disposition thereof by deed or will; and also to all
rights of entry for conditions broken, and other rights of entry. . . . (emphasis added).
This section was quoted in the opinion of Douglas, J., who concurred in the result only. 130
N.C. at 9-10, 40 S.E. at 693.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3 (1966). In view of the refusal of the court to give effect to
the 1844 statute, see note 42 supra, we may question whether the 1961 statute will have any
better success.
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that of the former railroad right of way, is now the same as that of
the portions of Ashland which were not affected by the conveyances
made by Abraham Clay in 1860. If, however, the right of entry was
not effectively devised by these wills, its present ownership is gov-
erned by the rules of intestate descent. In this event, the right of entry
is now owned by the same 384 persons, as unequal tenants in com-
mon, who took the possibility of reverter in the northwesterly acre,
if it passed by intestate descent. Presumably, the right of entry can
be exercised only by the cooperation of all 384 tenants in common.4
Until the right of entry is exercised, none of its holders has standing
to bring suit for partition, because none has a vested estate.15 No one
can acquire title by adverse possession, because the statute of limita-
tions does not run against the holders of future interests." No one
can acquire a tax title, because the land is not subject to taxation until
the fee simple on condition subsequent of Clay County Rural School
District is terminated. If ownership of the southwesterly acre of
Ashland is dependent upon intestate descent of Abraham Clay's right
of entry on breach of condition subsequent, it may never be possible,
as a practical matter, to perfect a merchantable title to the land in
anyone. Certainly the chances of perfecting one by October 1, 1972,
are non-existent.
AMERICAN LEGISLATION AFFECTING REVERSIONARY POSSIBILITIES
The chief evil of legal contingent remainders and executory inter-
44. SIMES & SMITH § 264; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 161, comment g, at 584-85; id.
§ 164, comment e, at 613; id. § 165, comment c, at 618-19; id., app. 23-33. See Methodist
Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N.C. 34, 39, 40 S.E. 691, 693 (1902) (opinion of Douglas,
J.).
45. Prior v. Prior, 395 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1965); Vinson v. Wise, 159 N.C. 653, 75 S.E. 732
(1912); SIMES & SMITH § 1772.
46. Klorner v. Nunn, 339 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1960); Miller v. Proctor, 330 Mo. 43,49 S.W.2d
84 (1932); Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 79 S.E.2d 479 (1954); Walston v. W.H. Applewhite
& Co., 237 N.C. 419, 75 S.W.2d 138 (1953); Sprinkle v. City of Reidsville, 235 N.C. 140, 69
S.E.2d 179 (1952); Brown v. Brown, 168 N.C. 4, 84 S.E. 25 (1915); SIMES & SMITH §§ 258,
1962, 1966.
A few states have statutes barring possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of
condition subsequent if their owners do not attempt to enforce them for a stipulated period
after breach of the condition. See note 53 infra; SIMES & SMITH § 258. There are some decisions
that a right of entry is barred by "waiver" or "laches" if no attempt is made to exercise it for
an extended period after breach of the condition. E.g., Robinson v. Cannon, 346 Mo. 1126,
145 S.W.2d 146 (1940) (fifty years); Metropolitan Park Dist. v. Unknown Heirs, 65 Wash. 2d
788, 399 P.2d 516 (1965) (sixty years).
47. E.g., VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 137.100 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
278(1) (Supp. 1971).
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ests is that they may be owned by unborn or unascertained persons
who cannot cooperate with the owner of the present possessory estate
to effectuate improvement, mortgage or sale." The duration of this
evil is limited, in effect, by the common law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, to a century or less. Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
on breach of condition subsequent are owned by living and, theoreti-
cally, ascertainable persons. This may be why American courts have
held them to be exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities4 9 The
exemption means that there is no limit to their duration. As has been
seen, a number of states have retained the common law rule that
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition
subsequent cannot be conveyed inter vivos or devised by will."0 If this
is so, they must pass on the death of an owner by intestate descent.
Under the common law doctrine of primogeniture, this usually meant
descent to a single heir, which did not result in an insuperable obsta-
cle to improvement or sale of the land. For example, if the southwes-
terly acre of Ashland were now owned by Clay County Rural School
District, subject only to a right of entry owned by Hanoch Clay alone,
Clay and the School District could cooperate to convey a fee simple
absolute. The combination of exemption from the Rule Against Per-
petuities, inalienability and abolition of primogeniture, however, re-
sults, as in the examples described in the preceding two sections, in
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry passing by descent to
persons so numerous that their effective cooperation with the owner
of the present possessory estate is practically impossible.
No one would intentionally convey or devise a limited interest in
one acre of land to 384 persons living in various parts of the world.
This absurd dispersion of ownership could be prevented, without de-
stroying the useful features of these reversionary possibilities, by
subjecting possibilities of reverter and rights of entry to the common
law Rule Against Perpetuities and making them freely alienable by
deed and by will. England has done both." Some American states
48. See notes 75-82 infra and accompanying text.
49. First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892) (possibility of
reverter); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) (right of entry); SIMES &
SMITH §§ 1238, 1239; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 372 (1944).
50. See notes 9, 16, 20, 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
51. As to alienability by deed and will, see notes 14-15, 34-35 supra. Rights of entry subject
to the Rule Against Perpetuities: In re Da Costa, [1912] 1 Ch. 337; In re Hollis' Hospital,
[1899] 2 Ch. 540; Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 4(3) (1925). Possibilities of
reverter subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities: Hopper v. Liverpool Corp., 88 Sol. J. 213
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have made possibilities of reverter and rights of entry transferable by
deed and by will.52 No American state has subjected these reversion-
ary possibilities to the Rule Against Perpetuities, but a number have
enacted statutes providing that possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry expire after a stipulated period, usually thirty years, following
their creation, so that the fee simple subject to one then becomes
absolute.53
(Lancaster Palatine Ct. 1944), noted in 62 LAW Q. REV. 222 (1946); Perpetuities and Accumu-
lations Act, c. 55, § 12 (1964). As § 3 of the latter Act adopts the "wait and see" doctrine, it
would seem that a possibility of reverter or right of entry on breach of condition subsequent
limited on a condition which might occur beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities
would be valid for twenty-one years after its creation. Hence, the effect of the Act is similar to
that of the recent American legislation limiting the duration of reversionary possibilities, see
note 53 infra.
52. See notes 16, 17, 21, 36-37, 40, 43 supra. But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 37b (Smith-
Hurd 1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-299 (1966) (inalienable and undevisable). Some of the
opposition to alienability probably springs from the realization that, so 1hng as reversionary
possibilities are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities and subject to no restriction on
duration, they may be used to create the equivalent of an executory interest free from the Rule
Against Perpetuities. If land is conveyed to Oak Grove Church so long as used for church
purposes, and then to John Hancock and his heirs, the executory interest of John Hancock is
void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Proprietors of Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 3
Gray (69 Mass.) 142 (1855). If, however, the land is conveyed on Monday to Oak Grove Church
so long as used for church purposes, the grantor will retain a possibility of reverter which is
exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities. If this is alienable, he may convey it on Tuesday
to John Hancock and his heirs, thus giving Hancock an interest virtually identical with the
executory interest. See Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. 2d 922
(1950); Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action,
85 HARv. L. REV. 729, 749 (1972).
53. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (1960) (thirty years) (§ 45-98 indicates that § 45-97
is applicable to all possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, whenever created, so that pre-
existing reversionary possibilities could not be preserved in any manner); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 689.18 (1969) (twenty-one years; excepts forfeiture provisions in conveyances to charities,
public transportation, etc.) (application of the section to an interest created before its effective
date was held unconstitutional in Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954));
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (Smith-Hurd 1969) (forty years) (held constitutional as to both
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry created before its effective date, Blackert v. Dugosh,
12 III. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 606 (1957)); Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 II1. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d
111 (1955); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.24 (1972 Supp.) (reverter provisions expire unless owner
records claim every twenty-one years; if created by instrument effective more than twenty years
before July 4, 1965, recording then would preserve for twenty-one years) (held constitutional
as to a possibility of reverter created before its enactment in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. City
of Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788 (Iowa 1970)); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.218-.223 (1969) (con-
verts possibilities of reverter into rights of entry and provides that rights of entry expire after
thirty years; permits preservation of those created before 1960 by recording of claim) (held
constitutional as to a right of entry created before its enactment in Atkinson v. Kish, 420
S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1967)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 103-06 (1964) (same as the Connecti-
cut statutes); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 143 (Supp. 1971) (thirty years) (reversionary possibili-
ties created before July 1, 1899, may be preserved by recording notice within three years after
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A statute providing for the expiration of possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry if the condition upon which they are limited does
not occur within a stipulated time takes care of those created after
the enactment of the statute. This type of statute usually applies to
reversionary possibilities created before its enactment unless the per-
son claiming a possibility of reverter or right of entry records notice
of his claim within some short period, usually a year, after enactment.
If such a claim is recorded, the statute will not clear the title to the
affected land. If no claim is recorded, retroactive application of the
July I, 1969; and those created between July 1, 1899, and June 30, 1969, by recording notice
not less than seventy nor more than seventy-three years after creation. Thereafter, a new notice
must be recorded every thirty years. Id. § 144); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 3 (1969)
(same as the Connecticut statutes) (this section was amended by Mass. Stat. 1961, ch. 448, §§ 2,
4, to eliminate certain exceptions and to permit preservation of pre-existing possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry by recording of notice before January 1, 1964. The constitutionality
of the amended section was suggested in Selectmen of Town of Nahant v. United States, 293
F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1968), holding that, if a possibility of reverter was created in 1898,
its enforcement was barred on January 1, 1964, by failure to record a notice before that date
under the complementary provision of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 31A (Supp. 1971).
The application of the latter section to pre-existing reversionary possibilities was held constitu-
tional in Town of Brookline v. Carey, 355 Mass. 424, 245 N.E.2d 446 (1969)); MICH. Comp.
LAWS ANN. §§ 554.61-.65 (Supp. 1971) (thirty-years; excepts possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry if terminable interest is held for public, educational, religious or charitable purposes;
permits preservation by recording of notice every thirty years); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.20(2)(3) (1947) (thirty years) (applicable only to interests created after 1937; rights of
entry barred six years after breach. In Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800
(1957), it was held that a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent, created in 1897 and
breached in 1946, while not barred by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20(2), was barred by failure
to record a claim within forty years under the Minnesota Marketable Title Act, although the
,.root of title" relied upon was the deed containing the condition. Id. § 541.023 (Supp. 1971)):
NEe. REV. STAT. §§ 76.2.100 to 76.2.105 (1966) (thirty years; excepts possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry in grants to railroads and public utilities) (held constitutional as to an
interest created before its enactment, despite lack of provision for preservation by recording,
Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 86 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904 (1971)); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 345 (McKinney 1968) (thirty years, unless renewal declaration is recorded before
expiration of thirty years or before September 1, 1961, and each ten years thereafter) (this
section was held unconstitutional as to a reversionary possibility created before its enactment
in Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965). N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 612 (McKinney 1963) (bars actions to enforce reversionary
possibilities ten years after breach of the condition)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.48 -
5301.56 (1970) (forty years; reversionary possibilities may be kept in force by recording notice
before expiration of forty years or by September 29, 1964, and every forty years thereafter);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-4-19 (1969) (when created after May 11, 1953, possibility of
reverter becomes void if condition does not occur within twenty years; those created in convey-
ances to the state, a railroad or public utility, or public, charitable, or religious purposes,
excepted). See also UNIFORM ACT RELATING TO REVERTER OF REALTY in 1944 HANDBOOK,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 209-10.
[Vol. 1972:517
FUTURE INTERESTS
statutory bar has sometimes been held unconstitutional. 4 Legislation
which is operative only as to reversionary possibilities created in the
future is useful, but it does not solve the problem of titles made
unmerchantable by possibilities of reverter and rights of entry created
at some remote time in the past.
Some fourteen states have marketable title acts which extinguish
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition
subsequent under some circumstances. Except in Minnesota and
Ohio, where the marketable title acts operate like the legislation
discussed in the two preceding paragraphs,55 it is only in rare cases
that a marketable title act will convert a fee simple determinable or
a fee simple on condition subsequent into a fee simple absolute. This
is because the person claiming the benefits of such an act must show
a conveyance to him, or to his predecessor in a chain of title, recorded
for more than the statutory period (usually forty years), purporting
to transfer a fee simple absolute; later conveyances must purport to
transfer a fee simple absolute, and the chain of title must not mention
the possibility of reverter or right of entry; finally, there must be no
claim by the owner of the possibility of reverter or right of entry on
breach of condition subsequent recorded within the statutory period."
The usual marketable title act would not help in clearing the title to
the northwesterly and southwesterly acres of Ashland because the
1860 deeds to the trustees for Oak Grove Church and Clay County
Rural School District did not purport to transfer estates in fee simple
absolute.
The Contingent Remainder of the Issue of Hanoch Clay
It will be recalled that the will of Reuben Clay, who died in 1960,
devised Ashland to
my eldest son, Hanoch Clay for and during the full term of his natural life,
54. As indicated in note 53 supra, the Florida and New York statutes were held unconstitu-
tional as to pre-existing interests. The Florida statute provided no means of preserving such
interests; the New York statute did so. Cf Jacobs v. Miller, 253 Iowa 213, 111 N.W.2d 673
(1961); Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949); Girard Trust Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950). See Ryman, The Iowa "Stale Uses and
Reversions Statute": Parameters and Constitutional Limitations, 19 DRAKE L. REv. 56 (1969);
P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 143 (2d ed. 1970); SIMES & TAYLOR 201-17.
55. See note 53 supra. But see notes 107-08 infra and accompanying text.
56. P. BASYE, supra note 54, at ch. 9 (with citations to the voluminous literature on legisla-
tion of this type); SIMES & TAYLOR 5-10; Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title
Acts, 47 IowA L. REV. 261, 279 (1962); Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or
Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1967).
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remainder, if he dies survived by issue, to his issue per stirpes, in fee simple
absolute and, if he dies without issue him surviving, to my second son, Phallu
Clay and his heirs;...
Hanoch and Phallu Clay are bachelors. Neither has issue now,
but either or both may marry and have issue in the future. It is
virtually certain that the will would be construed to devise a present
estate for life to Hanoch Clay, with alternative contingent remainders
in fee simple to the issue of Hanoch or to Phallu Clay." There is no
doubt that Hanoch Clay can convey his present estate for life; but
can Phallu Clay convey his contingent remainder in fee simple? As
has been seen, contingent remainders were not alienable under the
English common lawAs By the nineteenth century, however, English
conveyancers had devised means for circumventing this archaic rule.
Conveyances of contingent remainders by the judicial proceedings
called fine and common recovery were effective by estoppel, so that
the transferees owned the estates when and if they vested. 9 A convey-
ance supported by good or valuable consideration would be enforced
by the High Court of Chancery when the remainder vested. 0 More-
over, it had been recognized much earlier that a future interest, other-
wise inalienable, could be released to the person seised of the present
freehold estate.6 As has been seen, an English statute of 1845 permit-
ted conveyance of contingent remainders by deed.6 In this country,
most states permit conveyance of contingent remainders by ordinary
deed63 and the others permit transfer by a method usable in England
before 1845,64 so it is quite certain that Phallu Clay can convey his
contingent remainder in fee simple.
The unborn natural issue of Hanoch Clay, however, are not in a
position to join in a conveyance of their contingent remainder in
57. Pixlee v. Petty, 274 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1955); Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N.C. 570, 20
S.E. 295 (1894). See generally SIMES & SMITH §§ 146, 148-49, 152-53. Festing v. Allen, 12 M.
& W. 278, 152 Eng. Rep. 1204 (1843); Loddington v. Kime, I Salkeld 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 198
(1694).
58. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. See Doe ex dem. Brune v. Martyn, 8 B. &
C. 497, 108 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1828).
59. Doe ex dem. Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (1829).
60. Wright v. Wright, I Ves. Sr. 409, 27 Eng. Rep. 11 I I (1749-50).
61. Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612).
62. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
63. McNeal v. Bonnel, 412 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1967); Brown v. Fulkerson, 125 Mo. 400, 28
S.W. 632 (1894); Scott v. Henderson, 169 N.C. 660, 86 S.E. 603 (1915); Davis v. Davis, 3 N.C.
App. 536, 165 S.E.2d 553 (1969); SIMES & SMITH §§ 1857-59; RESTATEMENT OF PROPErTY
§ 162.
64. SIMES & SMITH §§ 1855, 1859.
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Ashland. Hanoch, who is now fifty-two, might marry a widow and
adopt her children. Under the traditional rules of construction of
wills, a class gift to the "issue" of a named person does not include
descendants by adoption unknown to the testator.15 A modern change
in judicial attitude has resulted in a tendency to include such descen-
dants when the will is recent, and several states now have statutes
creating a presumption that they should be included, even when the
will is old.6 It is possible, therefore, that the contingent remainder
to the issue of Hanoch Clay will pass to persons now in being but,
there being no means of identifying these persons, securing convey-
ances from them is not practicable.
Under the English common law a contingent remainder could not
take effect unless it vested at or before the time when the particular
estate for life preceding it terminated.17 It is evident, of course, that
the contingent remainder of the issue of Hanoch Clay will never take
effect if Hanoch dies without issue surviving him. But the common
law rule meant more than this; under it, a contingent remainder was
destroyed if the particular estate for life preceding it was destroyed
or prematurely terminated before the contingent remainderman was
born and ascertained. A present estate for life was destroyed by
forfeiture if its tenant was convicted of treason or felony, made a
feoffment in fee, levied a fine in fee or suffered a common recovery
in fee." A particular estate for life was destroyed by merger, and the
contingent remainder was destroyed with it if, after their creation, the
same person acquired both the particular estate for life and the next
vested estate of inheritance in reversion or remainder. 9 An 1845
English statute prevented the destruction of contingent remainders by
forfeiture or merger of the preceding particular estate for life.70 The
common law rules of destructibility of contingent remainders have
65. Ratermann v. Ratermann, 405 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. 1966); Re Brinkley's Will Trusts,
Westminster Bank v. Brinkley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 805; SIMES & SMITH §§ 546, 738 (Supp. 1972).
See also Thomas v. Thomas, 258 N.C. 590, 129 S.E.2d 239 (1963).
66. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 210, § 8 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23(3)
(1966). Under some recent statutes, descendents of Hanoch by a woman whom he never
married would be included. N.D. CENTURY CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1971).
67. Festing v. Allen, 12 M. & W. 278, 152 Eng. Rep. 1204 (1843); 1 FEARNE 465.
68. Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628); 1 FEARNE 466-67.
69. Burnsall v. Davy, I Bos. & Pul. 215, 126 Eng. Rep. 867 (1798); Thompson v. Leach, 2
Ventr. 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 391 (1690); 1 FEARNE 468-69.
70. Real Property Law Amendment Act, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, § 8 (1845).
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been recognized in American decisions." Some states have statutes
making them indestructible. The types of forfeiture of estates for life
which destroyed contingent remainders are probably non-existent in
most states.73 Even without statutory indestructibility, recent Ameri-
can decisions tend to reject destructibility of contingent remainders
by merger, the only practicable method available to the Clay broth-
ers.7 4 This being so, it is improbable that Hanoch, Phallu, Hesron and
Charmi Clay can destroy the contingent remainder of the issue of
Hanoch Clay in order to convey Ashland free from it.
The evil effects of indestructible future interests in land in unborn
or unascertainable persons were manifested in an acute form in the
famous case of Moore v. LitteL.75 A large tract of agricultural land,
known as the Hayscale Farm, was conveyed to John Jackson, then
aged sixty, for life, remainder to his heirs in fee simple. Under local
law, this created an estate for life in John Jackson, with an indestruc-
tible legal remainder in fee simple to the persons who would, at his
death, be entitled to inherit any land owned by him in fee simple at
that time.7 This group of persons could not, of course, be ascertained
definitely until the death of John Jackson. Within fifteen years after
this conveyance was made, the nearby village of Brooklyn became a
growing city which laid streets through the Hayscale Farm and sub-
jected it to special assessments and city taxes. The streets obstructed
cultivation of the farm, and its use for pasturage would require provi-
sion for fences and a water supply for each block. John Jackson,
theretofore a successful farmer, could not produce enough income by
71. Flora v. Wilson, 35 N.C. 344 (1852); Chessun v. Smith, 4 N.C. 274 (1816); Smus &
SMITH §§ 194-95, 197.
72. SIMES & SMITH § 207.
73. McCall, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in North Carolina, 16 N.C.L.
REv. 87, 96-108 (1938).
74. Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66 (1940); Windlow v. Speight, 187 N.C.
248, 121 S.E. 529 (1924); Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders In Missouri,
6 Mo. L. REV. 268 (1941); McCall, supra note 73, at 109-11; SIMS & SMITH § 209.
75. 41 N.Y. 66 (1869). The horrible effects of the future interest involved in this case are
vividly described in A. GULLIVER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
301-23 (1959).
76. At the English common law, a conveyance to A for life, remainder to the heirs of A,
gave A an estate in fee simple under the Rule in Shelley's Case, I Co. Rep. 93b, 104a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 206, 234 (1581). Moreover, even if such a conveyance had created a life estate and
remainder, the remainder would have been destructible by the life tenant at common law. See
notes 68, 69 supra and accompanying text. The New York Revised Statutes of 1829 had,
however, abolished both the Rule in Shelley's Case and the destructibility of contingent remain-
ders. Ch. 1, tit. 1, §§ 28, 32, 33 [1829] 1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 725.
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agricultural and pastoral uses of the Hayscale Farm to pay the new
taxes and assessments.
If John Jackson had owned the Hayscale Farm in fee simple,
there would have been at least three possible solutions to his prob-
lems, all involving subdivision of the farm into city lots and conver-
sion from agricultural to urban uses. First, he could have sold lots to
purchasers interested in erecting homes and business buildings. Sec-
ond, he could have mortgaged the land, used the money borrowed to
erect houses and business buildings, and leased the buildings to ten-
ants for fixed terms of years. Third, he could have leased lots for long
terms of years to tenants willing to erect buildings on them at their
own expense. As, however, John Jackson owned only an estate for
his own life, with the remainder in fee simple to pass to persons not
ascertainable until his death, he could not, either alone or with the
cooperation of the living members of his family, do any of these
things.
There were two reasons for John Jackson's disability. First, the
Statute of Gloucester provided that a life tenant who committed
waste should forfeit his estate and be liable for triple damages." This
statute, or ones like it, were and are in force in several American
states." Any substantial change, even though it increases the value
of the land, including the changing of meadow into arable land,79 or
the replacement of a building by one which would be of greater value
and use, may be waste. 0 In a jurisdiction where contingent remain-
ders are destructible, forfeiture of a life estate under such a statute
might destroy a remainder following it."1 If the life estate of John
77. 6 Edw. 1, c. 5 (1278).
78. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 815 (McKinney 1963); VERNON'S ANN.
MO. STAT. § 537.420 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538 (1969); SIMES & SMITH § 1659; Annot.,
16 A.L.R.3d 1344, 1344-61 (1967). See also Rouse v. Strickland, 260 N.C. 491, 133 S.E.2d
151 (1963); Parrish v. Parrish, 247 N.C. 584, 101 S.E.2d 480 (1958).
79. 1 W. CRUISE, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY *67
(1808).
80. Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (1929), affd, 231 App. Div. 704
(1930), affd. 256 N.Y. 670, 177 N.E. 186 (1931); McDonald v. O'Hara, 117 Misc. 517, 192
N.Y.S. 545 (1921); Smyth v. Carter, 18 Beav. 78, 52 Eng. Rep. 31 (1853). See also Homan,
Alterations By a Life Tenant or Tenant for Years as Waste, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 220 (1967).
Cf. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7,79 N.W. 738 (1899); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 140, comment f, at 466.
81. SIMES & SMITH § 195. See Richardson v. Richardson ,152 N.C. 705,709, 68 S.E. 217,
219 (1910); Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 9 (1893) (The report of this case in Starnes v. Hill, 16
S.E. 1011 (1893) omits the dictum about forfeiture for waste.). See also Edens v. Foulks, 2
N.C. App. 325, 326, 163 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1968); McCall, supra note 73, at 98-102.
Vol. 1972:517]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Jackson were forfeited and the remainder to his heirs destroyed, the
fee simple in Hayscale Farm would, presumably, have returned to the
grantor of the deed to John Jackson by way of reversion."2 Conse-
quently, John Jackson would run the risk of forfeiting his own estate
and destroying the remainder to his heirs if he converted any of the
Hayscale Farm from agricultural to urban uses, erected buildings on
it or permitted his lessees to do so.
Second, John Jackson, even with the cooperation of all living
members of his family, could not convey, by deed, lease, or mortgage,
any interest in Hayscale Farm which would be certain to continue
beyond his own life. Although his living children, considering his
advanced age, were likely to be his sole heirs, they might predecease
him and his heirs might be persons as yet unborn or unascertainable.
This inability to convey an indefeasible title was evident in the events
which actually occurred. At the age of seventy-six, John Jackson
conveyed his life estate to his eleven children. While their father lived
on to the age of eighty-nine, the children tried to finance payment of
the taxes and assessments by sales and mortgages but, being unable
to convey merchantable title, they could not realize the full value of
any part of the land and ultimately lost virtually all of it. The creation
of the remainder in unascertainable persons prevented effective use
of the land affected for twenty-nine years and inflicted ruin and dis-
tress upon the very family it was intended to benefit.
A later New York case, Losey v. Stanley,3 involved land which
was devised to Briggs, as trustee with power of sale, upon trust to pay
the net income to James W. Stanley during his life, with alternate
contingent remainders to the issue of Stanley and, in default of issue
him surviving, to others. Briggs died, and James W. Stanley, the life
beneficiary, was appointed successor trustee by the supreme court.
Stanley petitioned the supreme court for authority to sell or mortgage
the land held by him as trustee, alleging that the taxes were in default,
the houses on the land could not be rented for lack of repairs, the land
was, in consequence, unproductive, and that it would be lost if the
repairs were not made. The supreme court granted the petition and
Stanley gave a mortgage to Losey. After Stanley's death, the mort-
gage being in default, Losey secured a decree of foreclosure in the
82. Hobbs v. Yeager, 263 S.W. 225 (Mo. 1924); Festing v. Allen, 12 M. & W. 279, 152
Eng. Rep. 1204 (1843).
83. 147 N.Y. 560, 42 N.E. 8 (1895).
[Vol. 1972:517
FUTURE INTERESTS
supreme court.84 Upon appeal, the court of appeals conceded that a
court of equity could empower a trustee who lacked power under the
terms of the trust to sell or mortgage to do so, but concluded that,
despite the power of sale conferred on the trustee, the contingent
remainders were legal. The opinion does not make it clear whether
this conclusion was reached by construction of the will or by applica-
tion of the very broad New York substitute for the Statute of Uses,
which executes into legal estates the interests of all trust beneficiaries
entitled to possession.8 Having reached this conclusion, the court of
appeals decided that a court of equity has no power to authorize sale
or mortgage of legal future interests, no matter how great the necess-
ity.88
Despite the authority of the New York Court of Appeals and the
dearth of favorable English precedents, a number of American
courts, refusing to follow Losey, have held that they have inherent
power to authorize sale of the full fee simple, free of future interests
in unborn and unascertained persons, when the income is insufficient
to pay for repairs and taxes, so that the fee is in danger of being lost
by tax sale.87 The proceeds of such a sale are either invested in other
84. Losey v. Stanley, 83 Hun. 420, 31 N.Y.S. 950 (1894).
85. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.1 (McKinney 1967). In most states, the
trustee's power to sell the fee would keep the remainders from becoming legal estates until the
life tenant's death. Rarick, The Trustee's Estate and the Ultimate Interest (Part I), 8 OKLA.
L. REv. 1, 35 (1955).
86. There are cases in other states in accord with this view. See Stansbury v. Inglehart, 9
Mackey (20 D.C.) 134 (1891); Hoskins v. Ames, 78 Miss. 986, 29 So. 828 (1901); Soules v.
Silver, 118 Ore. 96, 245 Pac. 1069 (1926); Thurston v. Thurston, 6.R.I. 296 (1859). See also
Brown v. Brown, 83 W. Va. 415, 422, 98 S.E. 428, 431 (1919). These cases mention that the
remedy in England in such situations was by private act of Parliament and suggest that the
remedy in this country is by private act of the legislature. American state constitutions tend,
however, to impose severe restrictions on the enactment of private legislation. See, e.g., Mo.
CONST. art. III, § 40; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24.
87. Christopher v. Chadwick, 223 Ala. 260, 135 So. 454 (1931) (court has power to author-
ize life tenant to exchange vacant lot for income-producing land of greater value if transaction
clearly beneficial to minor remaindermen); Walker v. Blaney, 225 Ark. 918, 286 S.W.2d 479
(1956) (court has power to authorize life tenant to purchase contingent remainder owned by
presently unascertainable heirs of the body of a living person; extent of necessity not stated);
Cauffiel v. Cauffiel, 39 Del. Ch. 190, 161 A.2d 432 (1960) (court has power to authorize sale
of fee on petition of life tenants so as to cut off alternative contingent remainders to unborn
issue of life tenants and to others, where income is insufficient to cover necessary expenses);
Nash v. Crowe, 222 Ga. 173, 149 S.E.2d 88 (1966) (court properly ordered sale of fee devised
to widow for life, remainder to children in fee, with shifting executory interest to persons not
yet ascertainable in event of children predeceasing life tenant without surviving issue, on show-
ing that taxes and expenses exceeded income); Baldridge v. Coffey, 184 11. 73, 56 N.E. 411
(1900) (shifting executory interest on vested remainder in fee, circumstances like preceding
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land, subject to the same future interests, or placed in trust, the
income to be paid to the life tenant or other person who was entitled
to possession of the land and the principal to be paid over to the
owners of the future interests when the interests would have become
possessory. Some states have statutes empowering the courts to au-
thorize sale of the fee under these circumstances."8
The inadequacy of this narrow basis for relief is illustrated by the
recent Missouri case of Stephens v. Gillette.89 There, a forty-acre
tract of unimproved, unfenced land, ten acres of which were arable
and the rest covered with brush and scrub timber, was devised in 1926
to the testator's crippled granddaughter in fee, with a shifting execu-
tory interest to the testator's daughter if the grandaughter died with-
case); Coquillard v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 489, 113 N.E. 481 (1916) (court could authorize
sale of fee in farmland devised to widow for life, remainder to sons for life, remainder to unborn
children of sons, when growth of nearby city made subdivision and sale for urban uses essential
and income was much less than taxes); Lambdin v. Lambdin, 209 Miss. 672, 48 So. 2d 341
(1950) (court properly ordered sale of fee devised to life tenants with alternative contingent
remainders to their issue and the heirs of the testatrix determined at the death of the surviving
life tenant; plantation which did not produce enough income to pay taxes and repairs but was
valuable because of proximity to oil field); Whitten v. Whitten, 203 Okla. 196, 219 P.2d 228
(1950) (court may authorize sale of fee conveyed to life tenant, with remainder to the heirs of
his body, only if, by reason of some exigency growing out of changed conditions, it becomes
necessary in order that the body of the estate may be preserved); Caine v. Griffin, 232 S.C.
562, 103 S.E.2d 37 (1958) (court could authorize exchange of farmland producing $200 a year
income and subject to alternative contingent remainders in unborn and unascertainable persons,
for commercial building producing $3,000 a year income); Johnston v. Johnston, 276 S.W. 776
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1925) (court could order sale of fee in farmland devised to life tenant,
remainder to his children, when city had grown to it and income was less than taxes);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 179 (future interests in persons unborn or under disability; no
mention of future interests owned by persons in being who are not presently ascertainable; sale
only; showing that sale will be beneficial to persons unborn or under disability). See also
Traversy v. Bell, 195 Iowa 1243, 1249, 193 N.W. 439, 442 (1923) (court may authorize sale of
fee in land devised to life tenants, remainder to their children and descendants, only if it clearly
appears that otherwise it will be entirely lost); Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 245-47, 14
N.W.2d 360, 363-64 (1944); Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish
Other Interests by Judicial Process, 42 HARV. L. REv. 30 (1928); Rogers, Removal of Future
Interest Encumbrances-Sale of the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1437 (1964).
88. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2930 (1968); VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 528.010
(1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (Supp. 1969) authorizes the court to direct sale of the fee, as
against non-consenting remaindermen with indefeasibly vested interests, only when the plaintiff
has a life estate in lands which are unproductiv-e. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 296.26-.34 (1958), as
amended, (Supp. 1972-73) permits relief if the land is unproductive or its income, together
with all other income of the possessory tenant, is insufficient to pay his debts, maintenance
and costs of education.
89. 464 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). The report does not clearly state whether the
plaintiff took a fee subject to a shifting executory interest in her aunt or a life estate with
alternative contingent remainders to the heirs of her body and to her aunt.
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out bodily heirs. The daughter died, and the crippled granddaughter,
aged sixty and childless, sued the heirs of the daughter, seeking sale
of the fee simple absolute and investment of the proceeds, showing
that the land was producing no income and that the taxes were stead-
ily increasing. The tract could have been sold for $32,000, probably
because it was near a main highway leading from St. Louis and the
suburbs of that city were extending toward it. The applicable Mis-
souri statute directs a court to order a sale if the income of the estate
is insufficient to pay for repairs and taxes and assessments thereon."
Relief, however, was denied on the ground that the tract could be
rented for $300 a year, which was more than the current taxes. The
court seemed unconcerned with the results of its decision-that is,
that the elderly, incapacitated plaintiff could get no more than $200
a year income, and that the land could not be improved sufficiently
to be put to effective use because of the plaintiff's lack of means."
The rule that sale of the fee simple absolute may be authorized
only if the income is insufficient to pay for repairs and taxes, so that
the fee is in danger of being lost by tax sale, provides no relief for a
possessory life tenant, or a tenant in fee simple subject to a shifting
executory interest, when the income is sufficient to pay for repairs
and taxes but insufficient to give the possessory tenant an adequate
income for his own use. Yet the possessory tenant is almost always
the person, of all those interested, best known to, and most intended
to be benefited by the creator of the divided title in the land. Some
statutes recognize this by empowering the court to authorize sale if
that will be for the benefit of all persons with interests in the land,92
or for the benefit of the tenant in possession and not detrimental to
90. VERNON's ANN. MO. STAT. § 528.010 (1952).
91. The opinion does not observe that the testator knew and wished to benefit his crippled
granddaughter, the plaintiff, but could not know the persons who would take the shifting
executory interest after his daughter's death. One wonders if these persons opposed a judicially
ordered sale in order to force the plaintiff to sell her estate to them at an inadequate price. As,
under Missouri law, an adopted child is capable of taking through his parent by adoption
property limited expressly to the heirs of the body of his parent by adoption, id. § 453.090(4),
the plaintiff may yet be able to defeat the defendant's executory interest by adopting a child.
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500 (1958); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 45-1101 to -1104
(1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 22, § 50 (Smith-Hurd 1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2426 (1968);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 389.030, .040 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 62, 167-68 (1966);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A: 32-1, 32-3, 33-1, 34-1, 34-8, 34-14 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-11,
-11.1 (Supp. 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 128.110-.160 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 1561-
64 (1964); Model Act Providing for the Sale of Real Estate Affected With a Future Interest,
in SImES & TAYLOR 237. Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1147.1 -. 6 (1961) (expedient or for
best interests of all concerned).
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those with future interests. 3 California appears to give a life tenant
an absolute right to compel sale of the fee as against contingent
remaindermen, even though the land is fully developed and producing
income adequate to support the life tenant in comfort. 4 Other stat-
utes condition relief upon its being "necessary or expedient."95 One
statute wholly ignores the interest of the owner of the possessory
estate by permitting relief only if it is manifestly for the interest of
the holder of the future interest.
If the land is likely to increase in value, sale may deprive the
owners of future interests of the advantage of future increase. This
advantage could sometimes be saved by authorizing the owner of the
possessory estate to mortgage the fee simple in order to finance im-
provements designed to make the land usable and productive under
current conditions or to give a long lease to a tenant who will cove-
nant to make such improvements. The fact that some of the statutes
permit no relief except outright sale of the fee simple97 may go far to
explain decisions like that in Stephens." Other statutes do, however,
permit the court to authorize an exchange, mortgage, or lease. Some
93. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5303.21, .31 (1970); VA. CODE § 8.703.1 (1950), 8.703.2 (Supp.
1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-2-1 to -2-13 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971) (Those with
vested estates must consent except to an urgently needed lease of timber, oil, gas or minerals);
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-974 to -982 (1957).
94. CAL. CIVIL PRO. CODE §§ 752, 763, 781 (West 1955), as amended, § 763 (West Supp,
1972). IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.9 (1950) appears to confer an absolute right on a life tenant to
compel sale of the fee with the consent of the holder of the reversion. It is difficult to understand
why the consent of the holder of the reversion is relevant if the reversion can never become
possessory, as is the case when the life estate is followed by alternative indestructable contingent
remainders which exhaust all possibilities. SIMES & SMITH § 85. This is the situation of Hanoch
Clay, and it is probably the commonest situation in which a life tenant seeks sale of the fee.
95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 153 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 49
(1969); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW §§ 1602-15 (McKinney 1963) (expedient); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 34-4-7 (1969). Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1147.1-.6 (1961).
96. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-606 to -621 (1955). If all of the persons with future interests
are unborn, sale must be "necessary." Id. § 34-619.
97. The statutes of California, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, Oklahoma and Tennessee appear to authorize no relief except sale of the fee simple.
CAL. CIVIL PRO. CODE §§ 752, 763, 781 (West 1955), as amended, § 763 (West Supp. 1972);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500 (1958); IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.9 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 389.030 -.040 (1969); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2930 (1968); VERNON'S ANN. Mo.
STAT. § 528.010 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:32-1, 32-3, 33-1, 34-1, 34-8, 34-14 (1953);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1147.1 -.6; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-606 to -621 (1955). See also
notes 88, 92, 94, 96 supra.
98. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
99. D.C. ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 45-1101 to -1104 (1968) (sale or lease); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
22, § 50 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (sale, mortgage, lease, exchange, conversion, improvement); IND.
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permit only oil, gas and mineral leases.' If the tenant in possession
has only an estate for life, enabling him to finance improvements will
not help him if bringing wild land under cultivation, erecting a build-
ing, or drilling an oil well will entail forfeiture of his estate for waste
under the Statute of Gloucester.' 0' No doubt a statute empowering a
court to authorize a transaction designed to achieve an improvement
should be construed to modify the local version of the Statute of
Gloucester to the extent necessary to prevent forfeiture or triple dam-
ages.
Some of the statutes are narrowly limited as to the types of future
interests which may be overridden by a court-ordered sale. The Con-
necticut statute, for example, applies only if there is a remainder to
the heirs of a life tenant or, alternatively, to others. 02 This would have
helped the John Jackson family, 03 but it would be of no use to James
W. Stanley0 4 or Hanoch Clay, life tenants with remainder to their
issue. The Oklahoma statute applies only if persons not in being may
become entitled to a future interest.0 5 This would provide no relief
ANN. STAT. § 3-2426 (1968) (sale, exchange or lease); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 153
(1964) (sale, lease or mortgage); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183,§ 49 (1969) (sale or mort-
gage); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 62, 167-68 (1966) (sale, lease or mortgage); N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTIONS LAW §§ 1602-15 (McKinney 1963) (mortgage, lease or sale); N.C. GEN. STAr.
41-11, - 1.1 (Supp. 1969) (sale or mortgage); OHio REV. CODE §§ 5303.21, .31 (1970) (sale or
lease); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 128.110 -. 160 (sale, mortgage, lease, exchange, improvement or
other transaction); PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 1561-64 (1964) (sale, mortgage, lease, exchange);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-4-7 (1969) (sale or mortgage); VA. CODE §§ 8.703.1 (1950), 8.703.2
(Supp. 1971) (sale, lease or exchange); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-1 to -2-13 (1966), as
amended, (Supp. 1971) (sale, lease or mining lease); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 296.26 -.34 (1958),
as amended, (Supp. 1972-73) (sale, mortgage or lease); Wyo. STAT. § 1-974 to -982 (1957) (sale
or lease); Model Act Providing for the Sale of Real Estate Affected with a Future Interest, in
SIMES & TAYLOR 237 (sale, mortgage or lease). See notes 88, 92-96 supra.
100. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-222 to -224 (1968) (oil and gas lease); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-
10-12 (1960) (oil, gas, coal or mineral lease).
101. 6 Edw. 1, c. 5 (1278). See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
102. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500 (1958). See note 92 supra and accompanying text. The
Iowa statute, IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.9 (1950), appears to be limited to a life estate followed
by a contingent remainder. See note 94 supra. The Kentucky statute, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 389.030, .040 (1969), requires a particular estate followed by a reversion or remainder. See
note 92 supra. The Michigan statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2930 (1969), applies only
when there is a life estate. See note 88 supra. The Nebraska statute, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-
222 to -224 (1968), requires a life estate and contingent remainder. See note 100 supra. The
North Carolina statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-11, -11.1 (Supp. 1969), are restricted to a
life estate followed by a contingent remainder or a remainder vested subject to open to admit
afterborn members of the class of remaindermen. See note 92 supra.
103. See notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 83, 84 supra and accompanying text.
105. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1147.1 -.6 (1961). See note 92 supra. The Restatement
is similarly narrow, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 179. See note 87 supra.
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in the case of a future interest in living but unascertainable persons.
The Oregon statute applies only if the future interest follows a trust. 0
At the other extreme from the statutes that are restricted to remain-
ders on life estates are some which permit a sale under court order
to override a possibility of reverter or right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent. 07 The disposition of proceeds of such a sale,
however, presents problems. If land had been conveyed to "Justin
Miller and his heirs so long as Duke Chapel stands" and a sale of
the fee simple free of the possibility of reverter of the grantor were
directed, would the proceeds of the sale have to be held in trust so
long as Duke Chapel stands? What if the land had been conveyed
subject to a condition subsequent against any but residential use and
the sale overriding the right of entry on breach of condition subse-
quent is to a purchaser who intends to use the land for business
purposes?0 '
Ashland is a prosperous farm producing ample income to pay for
taxes, repairs and the comfortable support of the life tenant, Hanoch
Clay. Hence, if Clay County is in Missouri, sale of the fee simple free
of the contingent remainder of the issue of Hanoch Clay is not possi-
ble.'09 if Clay County is in North Carolina, the court may authorize
sale of the fee simple, free of this remainder, if it finds that "the
interest of all parties require or would be materially enhanced by
it."I0
The Executory Interest of the Issue of Hesron Clay
The will of Reuben Clay, who died in 1960, devised Ashland, if
106. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 128.110 -. 160 (1969). See note 92 supra.
107. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 22, § 50 (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. REAL PROP. ATIONs LAW
§§ 1602-15 (McKinney 1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-1 to -2-13, as amended, (Supp,
1971); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-974 to -982 (1957); Model Act Providing for the Sale of Real Estate
Affected With a Future Interest, in SINIES & TAYLOR 237.
108. The New York statute directs that proceeds of sale are to be distributed as in the case
of a partition sale. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTiONs LAW §§ 961, 1613(3) (McKinney 1963). This
would mean immediate distribution to each owner of a present or future interest in the land of
the estimated value of his interest. The Model Act would empower the court to remould the
condition so as to give the owner of the possibility of reverter or right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent an appropriate interest in the proceeds of sale. SIMES & TAYLOR 236-38.
The other statutes appear to make no provision for the peculiar problem created by reversion-
ary possibilities exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Illinois statute restricting the
duration of some reversionary possibilities would help in some situations. ILL. ANN. STAT, Ch.
30, § 37e (Smith-Hurd 1969). See note 53 supra.
109. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (Supp. 1969).
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the present life tenant, Hanoch Clay, dies without issue him surviv-
ing, to
my second son, Phallu Clay and his heirs; but if both my said sons shall die
without issue them surviving, the said estates and interests shall pass, upon the
death of the survivor of them, to the issue then living of my third son, Hesron
Clay, per stirpes in fee simple ...
Hesron Clay is now forty-eight. He is married, has four children,
and may have more. Hanoch and Phallu Clay are bachelors aged,
respectively, fifty-two and fifty. If Hanoch Clay dies without surviv-
ing issue during the lifetime of Phallu Clay, Phallu will have a vested
present estate in fee simple. If Phallu later dies without surviving
issue, Ashland will pass to the issue of Hesron Clay living at that time
by way of executory interest."' Although executory interests could
not be conveyed or devised at common law,"' they are transferable
by deed and will under current law in both England"' and this coun-
try."' This being so, the four children of Hesron now in being can
convey their executory interest. If any of them are minors, this will
have to be done under court order in a guardianship proceeding.
Hesron may have more children in the future, who may survive Han-
och and Phallu Clay. A child of his, now in being or born hereafter,
may die before the survivor of Hanoch and Phallu, survived by chil-
dren who will be issue of Hesron Clay. Hence, persons not yet born
may be entitled to all or part of the executory interest devised to the
issue of Hesron Clay living at the death of the survivor of Hanoch
and Phallu Clay.
The problem of conveying merchantable title to Ashland free of
the executory interest of the unborn issue of Hesron Clay is virtually
the same as the problem of cutting off the contingent remainder of
the unborn issue of Hanoch Clay, discussed in the preceding section
of this article, except that executory interests have never been des-
tructible by the tenant of the present estate," 5 and some of the stat-
utes empowering courts to authorize sale of the fee simple free of
I II. Estate of Carter v. Carter, 404 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1966); Kindred v. Anderson, 357 Mo.
564, 209 S.W.2d 912 (1948); Newbern v. Barnes, 3 N.C. App. 521, 165 S.E.2d 526 (1969);
SIMNES & SMITH §§ 191, 205, 206, 222. It could be argued that, if the order of the deaths of
Hanoch and Phallu were reversed, the surviving issue of Hesron would take by way of contin-
gent remainder.
112. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 63-64 supra.
115. Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590,79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620); PIGorr, COMMON RECOVERIES
127, 134 (2d ed. 1770).
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future interests in unborn and unascertained persons may not be
broad enough to cover executory interests." '6 The Missouri statute is
broad enough to cover executory interests, but sale under it is not
authorized because Ashland is producing enough income to pay for
repairs and taxes.117 The North Carolina statute mentions only con-
tingent remainders to unborn or unascertainable persons and so may
not be broad enough to empower the court to authorize a sale which
would override the executory interest of the unborn issue of Hesron
Clay." S
The Equitable Charge in Favor of Charmi Clay or His Issue
When Reuben Clay died in 1960, his will devised Ashland, if both
Hanoch and Phallu Clay die without issue them surviving, to the then
living issue of Hesron Clay
subject to a charge in the amount of$10,000 in favor of my fourth son, Charmi
Clay, if he is then living, or in favor of his issue per stirpes, if he is then dead
and issue of his survive.
Charmi Clay is now forty-six and married, but childless. This
provision of the will created an equitable charge which resembles, in
some respects, a beneficial interest under a trust."' It is clear that a
court of equity has inherent power to authorize the holder of legal
title to land which is subject to an equitable charge to sell it free of
the charge and to secure the charge on the proceeds of sale or other
property.'20 This power falls into the same category as the inherent
power of a court of equity to authorize a trustee to deviate from the
terms of the trust if, owing to circumstances not known to the settlor,
and not anticipated by him, compliance with the terms of the trust
would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the pur-
poses of the trust.12' In the exercise of the latter power it is well settled
116. See notes 88, 92, 94, 100, 102 supra.
117. VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. § 528.010 (1952). See notes 88-90 supra and accompany-
ing text.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (Supp. 1969) mentions only contingent remainders to "per-
sons who are not in being, or when the contingency has not yet happened which will determine
who the remaindermen are." Id. § 41-11.1 mentions only an estate in a class which is vested
subject to open to admit after born members.
119. Thompson v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1943); Davis v. Stephens, 344 Mo. 24,
124 S.W.2d 1132 (1939); Carter v. Worrell, 96 N.C. 358, 2 S.E. 528 (1887); King v. Denison,
I V. & B. 260, 35 Eng. Rep. 102 (1813); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 10, comment
a, at 28 (1959); ScoTT § 10; Annot., 134 A.L.R. 361 (1941); Annot., 116 A.LR. 7 (1938).
120. Frewin v. Charleton, I Eq. Ca. Abr. 386, pl. 4, 21 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1712).
121. SCOTT § 167; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959); Marshall, Deviations
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that a court of equity may authorize a trustee to make a sale,122
mortgage23 or lease 14 of land which will override equitable future
interests under the trust.
How KING GEORGE SLEW THE DRAGON
Conveyances of land by way of subinfeudation, under which the
transferee was to hold the land as a feudal vassal of the transferor,
were sometimes upon the express condition subsequent that the lord
could terminate the tenant's estate if the latter failed to perform the
feudal services due for the land.'2 Statutes of 1278 and 1285 had the
effect of treating every subinfeudation as being on such a condition
subsequent. 26 A statute of 1290 forbade further subinfeudation in fee
simple'27 but conditions subsequent continued to be used to enforce
obligations to pay money. 28 The English courts refused to enforce
conditions subsequent in conveyances in fee simple if their purpose
was to restrict the use of the land conveyed 129 or to restrain aliena-
from the Terms of a Trust, 17 MODERN L. REV. 420 (1954); Scott, Deviation From the Terms
of a Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1025 (1931).
122. Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931) (although terms of trust forbade
sale); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153 S.E.2d 449 (1967); Winning-
ton v. Foley, 1 P. Wms. 536, 24 Eng. Rep. 505 (1719); Basset v. Clapham, 1 P. Wms. 358, 24
Eng. Rep. 425 (1717); Platt v. Sprigg, 2 Vern. 303, 23 Eng. Rep. 796 (1693); SCOTT § 190.4
(citing statutes which amplify the inherent power); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190,
commentf at 420 (1959).
123. Seigle v. First Nat'l Co., 338 Mo. 417,90 S.W.2d 776 (1936); cf Townsend v. Lawton,
2 P. Wms. 379, 24 Eng. Rep. 775 (1726); SCOTT § 191.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 191, comment d, at 425 (1959).
124. SCOTT § 189.4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 189, comment d, at 419 (1959).
See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Van Raalte, 214 Mo. App. 172, 184, 259 S.W. 1067, 1071
(1924); Cox v. Kinston Carolina R. & Lumber Co., 175 N.C. 299, 308,95 S.E. 623,627 (1918).
125. T. MADOX, FORMULARE ANGLICANUM 178 ch. CCXC, 221 ch. CCCLXVIII, 278 ch.
CCCCLXX, 297 ch. DXIII, 305 ch. DXXXIV (1702). By modern analysis, some of these
conveyances would create a fee simple determinable and a possibility of reverter rather than a
fee simple on condition subsequent.
126. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 4 (1278); Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1,
Stat. I, c. 21 (1285).
127. Statute of Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, Stat. 1, Quia Emptores Terrarum, cc. 1-3
(1290).
128. T. MADOX, FORMULARE ANGLICANUM 318 ch. DLX, 323 ch. DLXIX, 328 ch.
DLXXIX, 402 ch. DCCXXXVI, 413 ch. DCCXLVII (1702). A modern court might find that
some of these, also, created a fee simple determinable and a possibility of reverter.
129. Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, Trin., pl. 15 (1506); Puseto's Case, Y.B. 21 Hen. 7,
Mich., pl. 10 (1506); Fitz-Hugh v. Cornewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. 6, Trin., pl. 21 (Exch. Ch. 1429); 1
E. COKE, INSTITUTES *206b (1628); J. PERKINS, PROFITABLE BOOKE § 731 (1642); W. SnEP-
PARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES 131 (1648). See also Sir Edward Coke's Case,
Godbolt 289, 78 Eng. Rep. 169 at 175 (1623); Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep.
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tion.131 Most American courts have followed the English view that
conditions restraining alienation of estates in fee simple are void,'13
but, unlike the English courts, they will enforce conditions imposing
use restrictions in conveyances in fee simple.3  As England made
rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent devisable and alien-
able133 and subjected them to the Rule Against Perpetuities3 4 be-
fore the abolition of primogeniture, 131 legal rights of entry on breach
of condition subsequent, although still permitted,' do not cause the
316 (1614); Eyliff v. Chopley, 1 Bulst, 42, 80 Eng. Rep. 746 (1610); Earl of Pembroke's Case,
Jenk. 266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. 6, Hil., pl. 21
(1443). Cf Flower v. Hartopp, 6 Beav. 476, 49 Eng. Rep. 910 (1843). However, a condition
against other uses in a conveyance for public or charitable purposes is valid if it does not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities. Walsh v. Secretary of State of India, 10 H.L.C. 367, 11 Eng.
Rep. 1068 (1863); Re Robinson, [1897] 1 Ch. 85 (C.A.), Re Macnamara, 104 L.T. 771 (1911).
Cf Attorney General v. Pyle, I Atk. 435, 26 Eng. Rep. 278 (1738); In re Blunt's Trusts, [1904]
2 Ch. 767; In re Randell, 38 Ch. D. 213 (1888).
130. Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744, 78 Eng. Rep. 977 (1600); Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep.
la, 3b, 76 Eng. Rep. 845, 854 (1572); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. 7, Mich., pl. 28 (1494);
Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. 7, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. 6, Hil., pl. 21 (1443);
Mayn v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. 4, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous, Liber Assissarum 33 Edw. 3,
pl. 11 (1359); N. STRATHAM, ABRIDGMENT, "Conditions," pl. 12 (1495); R. BROOKE, GRAUNDE
ABRIDGEMENT, "Conditions," pl. 57, 135, 239 (1573); 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *222b -223a
(1628).
131. Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13 (1933); Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N.C.
460, 48 S.E. 785 (1904); Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE
L.J. 961, 972-75 (1935).
132. Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 (1879); O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan. 616 (1875);
Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. (25 Mass.) 284 (1829); Lawrence v. Gifford, 17 Pick. (34 Mass.)
366 (1835); Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442 (1869); Sperry's Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387 (1832);
Loring, Estates Upon Condition, I Am. L. REV. 265 (1867); Goldstein, Rights of Entry and
Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARV. L. REV. 248 (1940);
Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land; Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees, 27
TEX. L. REV. 158 (1948). See Carolina & N.W. Ry. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465, 81 S.E. 682
(1914).
133. See notes 14, 15, 34-35, 51 supra.
134. See note 51 supra. See also In re Peel's Release, [1921] 2 Ch. 218; In re Da Costa,
Clarke v. Church of England Collegiate School, [1912] 1 Ch. 337; Dunn v. Flood, 25 Ch. D.
629 at 633 (1882), affd, 28 Ch. D. 586 at 592 (1885); In re MacLeay, L.R. 20 Eq. 186 at 190
(1875).
135. The doctrine of primogeniture, see note 27 supra, was abolished in England by the
Administration of Estates Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 1-3, 45-46, 52 (1925).
136. Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 7 (1925), as amended, Law of Property
(Amendment) Act, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. I I, Sch. (1926); R. MAUDSLEY & E. BURNS, LAND LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 5n (2d ed. 1970); R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 142-43 (3d ed. 1966). In a letter of Jan. 4, 1972 to the writer, Professor Maudsley
has suggested that the courts may and should restrict the rights of entry on breach of condition
subsequent on a fee simple which may exist as legal interests to those enforcing the payment
of rent charges.
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trouble there that they do in this country. They are less numerous,
both because the permissible grounds for forfeiture are more limited
and because those created at remote times in the past have been
invalidated by the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Those
which exist are necessarily of recent creation and are likely to be
owned by a single ascertainable person rather than by the heirs of
someone who died a century or more ago. If Clay County were in
England, the southwesterly acre of Ashland would not be subject to
a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent owned by 384
tenants in common with unequal shares.1 37
With the sole exception of the right of entry on breach of condi-
tion subsequent, no legal future interest in land has been permitted
in England since 1925. Under legislation enacted in that year, the
only estates in land which are capable of subsisting or of being con-
veyed or created at law are an estate in fee simple absolute in posses-
sion, and a term of years absolute. 13 Life estates, determinable es-
tates for years, 139 reversions and remainders expectant upon such
estates, executory interests, powers of appointment, equitable
charges, determinable and defeasible estates in fee simple, and possi-
bilities of reverter may exist only as equitable interests under trusts
and are subject to being overridden by the exercise of the statutory
powers of the trustee owner of the legal fee simple absolute to sell,
mortgage and lease the land.'40 A beneficial owner of both the legal
and equitable fee simple absolute who wishes to create interests in
land that may exist only as equitable interests may vest the legal fee
simple absolute in trustees of his own selection; 4' if he creates such
137. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
138. Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1 (1925).
139. E.g., the estate created by a conveyance or devise "to John Stiles for ninety-nine years
if he shall so long live."
140. Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 2, 4 (1925).
141. Id. § 23. These are called "trustees for sale." The trustee owner of the legal fee simple
absolute has statutory power to make sales, exchanges, mortgages and long-term leases of the
land which override all of the equitable interests in it, including all contingent remainders,
executory interests, possibilities of reverter and equitable charges. Settled Land Act, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. S, §§ 38, 41, 71 (1925); Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 2, 28 (1925).
He cannot, moreover, be deprived of his statutory powers by the terms of the instrument
creating the trust or by his own release or contract. Settled Land Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18,
§§ 104, 106 (1925). Proceeds of sales and mortgages are "capital money," as are part of the
proceeds of sales of timber and of rent paid under mining leases. Id. §§ 47, 52, 55-57, 61, 66,
71, 117. If the legal fee simple absolute is vested in two or more independent trustees, or a trust
corporation, selected by, or under powers conferred by, the settlor, capital money is payable
to the trustees or corporate trustee of the fee simple. Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.
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interests without designating trustees of the fee simple, the beneficial
holder of the present equitable interest, commonly a life interest,"'
takes the legal fee simple absolute as trustee for himself and the other
holders of equitable interests in the land.'
If Clay County were in England, therefore, Hanoch Clay, as life
tenant, would own the entire legal fee simple absolute in all of Ash-
land, except the seven acres conveyed by Abraham Clay in 1860, and
would have power to convey a merchantable title in fee simple abso-
lute to these 193 acres, free of the contingent remainders of his own
unborn issue and his brother Phallu Clay, of the executory interest
of the issue of his brother Hesron Clay, and of the equitable charge
in favor of his brother Charmi Clay, or his issue. The Columbia,
Clayton and Maryville Railroad would hold legal title in fee simple
absolute to the easterly five rods of Ashland, and the Trustees of Oak
Grove Church would hold legal title in fee simple absolute to the
northwesterly acre of Ashland. If, as is probable, the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to possibilities of reverter
created in England in 1860, each of these parcels would be held upon
trust for the devisees under the will of Reuben Clay. Hanoch Clay,
as life tenant under that will, would be entitled to demand convey-
ances of the legal fee simple to himself and, after receiving them, to
20, §§ 27(2), 28 (1925). If, however, the legal fee simple absolute is vested by statute in the
equitable life tenant, he must arrange to have capital money paid to independent trustees, either
two or more individuals or a single corporation. Settled Land Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, §§ 18,
30, 34, 75. The life tenant-statutory estate owner may, as an alternative, arrange to have capital
money paid into court, which means that the Bank of England administers it as trustee for the
holders of equitable interests in the land.
Proceeds of a mortgage which overrides equitable interests in the land may be used by, or
at the direction of, the trustee owner of the legal fee simple to pay off encumbrances on the
land or to pay for improvements to the land, including the cost of reducing uncultivated land
to cultivation, subdivision of previously rural land into urban lots, and erection of buildings,
Id. §§ 71, 73, 75, 83-84, 89, 117, and Third Schedule. In some cases the cost of improvements
is to be amortized, wholly or in part, from income. The making of improvements authorized
by law is not waste. Id. § 89. Capital money not used to discharge encumbrances or pay for
improvements is invested and held in trust by the trustees who receive it. The income is paid
to the life tenant or other person who is, or would be if there had not been a sale, entitled to
the rents and profits of the land and the corpus is held for the owners of equitable future
interests in the land. Id. §§ 73, 75.
142. Although he is commonly referred to as "the life tenant," the equitable interest of the
statutory estate owner may be a determinable estate for years, see note 139 supra, a determina-
ble fee subject to a possibility of reverter, or a fee simple subject to a shifting executory interest.
He may be an equitable tenant in tail.
143. Settled Land Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, §§ 1, 16, 19, 20, 21, 107 (1925). The Act
makes provision for other trustees of the legal fee simple absolute if there is no holder of the
present equitable interest or he is an infant, lunatic, or bankrupt. Id. §§ 23, 24, 26-28, 102.
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make a sale which would override the future interests. The southwes-
terly acre of Ashland would be owned by Clay County Rural School
District in fee simple absolute, free of trust, because the right of entry
on breach of condition subsequent.imposed upon that acre by Abra-
ham Clay's 1860 conveyance to the school district would be void ab
initio under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
The effect of the 1925 English legislation is to abolish the re-
straints on improvement and alienation imposed by the mere exist-
ence of legal future interests under the seventeenth and eighteenth
century English law which is still in force in this country. It ensures
that there are always competent, living adults or a trust corporation
with the right to make needed improvements to every piece of land,
without fear of forfeiture or liability for waste, and with the power
to mortgage, give long leases, and convey merchantable title in fee
simple absolute, free of future interests. Improvement, mortgage,
lease and sale may be effected without the expense, difficulty and
delay of conducting judicial proceedings against unborn and unascer-
tained owners of future interests. Yet all of the types of future inter-
ests known to the old law are recognized and protected in the same
manner that future beneficial interests under trusts are protected in
this country. The English legislation preserves the freedom to create
future interests but deprives them of their former effect of restraining
the use and transfer of land in the manner most beneficial to its
owners and the community.'
THE MODEST PROPOSAL
American estate planners are familiar with and often use the
device required by the 1925 English legislation for avoiding the chief
evils of future interests in property. That is, they create future inter-
ests as beneficial interests under trusts and confer upon the trustees
powers to make improvements and to make mortgages, leases and
sales of the trust property which will override the future interests.
This is virtually the only method used for creating future interests in
chattels personal and investment securities and certainly the only
satisfactory one.' It is often used to create future interests in land,
144. Bordwell, English Property Reform and its American Aspects, 37 YALE L.J. 1, 179
(1927); Crane, The Law of Real Property in England and the United States; Some Compari-
sons, 36 IND. L.J. 282 (1961); Schnebly, "Legal" and "Equitable" Interests in Land Under the
English Legislation of 1925, 40 HARV. L. REV. 248 (1926).
145. In general, the English courts have never enforced future interests in chattels personal
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and a statutory requirement that it be the exclusive method of creat-
ing future interests in land would be unlikely to encounter serious
constitutional or practical difficulties. American legislation providing
that future interests in land may be created hereafter only as benefi-
cial interests under trusts and that the trustees shall have power to
improve the land and to override the future interests by mortgage,
lease or sale would be helpful, but it would not solve the problem of
future interests created prior to its enactment. It would not eliminate
legal remainders and executory interests until the expiration of lives
in being and twenty-one years-perhaps a century after enact-
ment-and would permit existing legal possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent to continue to work
evil forever.
The King in Parliament was subject to no constitutional limita-
tions on the sovereign legislative power, so that the 1925 English
legislation could and did convert all existing legal future interests in
land into beneficial interests under trusts, subject to being overridden
by conveyances made by the trustees. The constitutional power of an
American state legislature to do likewise is, at best, doubtful" But
that which cannot constitutionally be done directly may sometimes
be accomplished indirectly by exercise of the power of taxation. "7
There is no doubt of the constitutional power of a state legislature to
impose property taxes on interests in land. Land taxes are usually
based upon the full value of the unencumbered fee simple absolute
and the whole property tax is ordinarily assessed against the person
seised of the present freehold, even when he is a life tenant subject to
a mortgage, the rights of a tenant for years in possession, and the
interests of owners of freehold future interests. "' In effect, the person
seised of the present freehold usually bears the whole burden of the
land tax, although other persons with interests in the land derive as
and investment securities except as beneficial interests under trusts. American courts have
commonly enforced legal future interests in chattels personal and securities but they sometimes
do so by means of a judicially created trust of the whole title. SINIEs & SN11TH §§ 351-71, 1711-
23; Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal, 39 YALE L.J. 771 (1930).
146. See notes 53-54 supra; J. SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTER-
ESTS IN LAND ch. 4 (1953).
147. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533.(1869).
148. Weller v. Searcy, 343 Mo. 768, 123 S.W.2d 73 (1938); Jeffreys v. Hocutt, 195 N.C,
339, 142 S.E. 226 (1928); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302 (Supp. 1971); SINIFS & SNIITH § 1693;
Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 670 (1962); Annot., 126 A.L.R. 862 (1940); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 311 (1935);
Annot., 75 A.L.R. 416 (1931); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 1384 (1922). Cf. Willard v. Blount, 33 N.C.
(II Ired. L.) 624 (1850).
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much or more benefit from the state's protection of their interests in
the land. Separate assessment of the interests of mortgagees, 5 ten-
ants for years, 5' holders of mineral interests 5' and owners of con-
dominium apartments 2 is not, however, unknown. Separate assess-
ment of the interests of life tenant and remainderman,'5 3 tenant in
fee simple defeasible and holder of an executory interest, tenant in
fee simple determinable and holder of a possibility of reverter, and
tenant in fee simple on condition subsequent and holder of the right
of entry on breach of condition, would thus not seem to violate the
usual provisions of state constitutions. Therefore, it should be possi-
ble for a state legislature to discourage the creation of legal future
interests and encourage the conversion of existing legal future inter-
ests into interests under trusts by imposing a property tax on legal
future interests in land.
The exact form of the legislation needed in a particular state will
depend upon the extent to which the Statute of Gloucester, 54 impos-
ing forfeiture of the estate and liability in triple damages upon a life
tenant who improves the land or sells timber, stone, gravel, minerals,
coal, oil or gas, is still enforced. Some states have substantially modi-
fied, by statute or judicial decision, the provisions of the Statute of
Gloucester insofar as they penalize reasonable use of land'-for
example, some permit a tenant for life to sell timber in accordance
with the usages of good husbandry, 55 and although some prevent a
tenant for life from giving an oil or gas lease, 57 others allow him to
do so but require that he invest the royalties for the benefit of the
remainderman, keeping only the income.58
149. VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. §§ 146.010 to .020 (1952), as amended, (Supp. 1971); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 105-202, -302 to -305 (Supp. 1971).
150. State ex rel. Ziegenhein v. Mission Free School, 162 Mo. 332, 62 S.W. 998 (1901);
State v. Grosvenor, 149 Tenn. 158, 258 S.W. 140 (1923). Cf Willard v. Blount, 33 N.C. (11
Ired. L.) 624 (1850). Annot., 154 A.L.R. 1309 (1945); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 701 (1929).
151. See Dorman v. Minnich, 336 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302
(Supp. 1971); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 513 (1922).
152. VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 448.100 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-21
(1966).
153. Cf Sherrill v. Board of Equalization, 452 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1970) (life estate and
remainder not separately assessable under statute in force).
154. See notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
155. SIMES & SMITH §§ 1654, 1658-59.
156. Brogdon v. McMillan, 116 Ga. App. 34, 156 S.E.2d 828 (1967). But see Rouse v.
Strickland, 260 N.C. 491, 133 S.E.2d 151 (1963).
157. E.g., Eide v. Tveter, 143 F. Supp. 665 (D.N.D. 1956).
158. D.'Evereaux Hall Orphan Asylum v. Green, 226 So. 2d 725 (Miss. 1969); Johnson v.
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Another factor which would affect the exact form of legislation
needed in a particular state is its treatment of entails. If estates tail
still exist, as under the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus, 5 remain-
ders following them cause little trouble because a tenant in tail is not
impeachable for waste,160 and he may at any time destroy the remain-
der. 1' If, however, estates tail have been converted by statute into life
estates with indestructible remainders in the heirs of the body of the
first taker 2 or into estates in fee simple,"3 so that what would have
been destructible remainders become indestructible executory inter-
eests, legal future interests incident to what would have been estates
tail may be very troublesome. The existing system of assessment of
property taxes on interests in land must also be considered.
The modest proposal is for legislation, keyed to the existing stat-
utes and case-law of each state, to the effect that:
I. A person seised of a freehold estate in land shall not forfeit
his estate or incur liability in damages for changes in the land made
with the reasonable and good faith intent of improving ifs usefulness,
value, or beauty, including the erection, alteration or demolition of
buildings or other structures, conversion from meadow or pasture to
cultivation or vice versa, conversion from rural to urban uses, and
conversion from residential to commercial or industrial uses, or vice
versa.
II. A person seised of a freehold estate in land shall not forfeit
his estate or incur liability in damages for sale of timber, stone,
gravel, earth, minerals, coal, oil or gas, if the sale price is reasonable
and the proceeds are paid to a corporation authorized to act as trus-
tee, which is not, and is not controlled by, the person seised, upon
Messer, 437 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). Cf Kimbark Exploration Co. v. Von Lintel,
192 Kan. 791, 391 P.2d 55 (1964) (life tenant entitled to all royalties payable under oil and gas
lease given by testator whose will created life estate and remainder even though wells were not
drilled before testator's death).
159. Statute of Westminster II, De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. I, cc. 1-4 (1285).
160. W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES 131 (1648). See Mary Por-
tington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613); Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case,
6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 314 (1605); Earl of Pembroke's Case, Jenk. 266, pl. 73,
note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597).
161. Gulliver exdem. Corrie v. Ashby, 4 Burr. 1929, 98 Eng. Rep. 4 (1766); 2 FEARNE 107
(5th ed. 1795) (Powell's note).
162. VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. § 442.470 (1952); Moore v. Moore, 329 S.W.2d 742 (Mo.
1959), noted in 25 Mo. L. REv. 438 (1960).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1966); Tremblay v. Aycock, 263 N.C. 626, 139 S.E.2d 898
(1965).
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trust for the holders of present and future estates in the land as their
interests may appear.
III. If a possibility of reverter conditioned upon an event which
has not yet occurred has been in existence for more than thirty years,
the person seised of the present freehold estate shall be entitled to
have the possibility of reverter assessed for property taxation sepa-
rately from the other interest or interests in the fee simple absolute.
If the tax so assessed against the possibility of reverter is not paid by
the last day upon which it may be paid without interest or penalty,
the non-payment of the tax shall operate as a release of the possibility
of reverter to the person seised of the present freehold estate, subject
to the unpaid tax and interest and penalties due thereon, which re-
lease shall extinguish the possibility of reverter.
IV. If a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent on a
fee simple has been in existence for more than thirty years and has
not yet been exercised by entry or action, whether or not the event
upon which it is conditioned has occurred, the person seised of the
present freehold estate shall be entitled to have the right of entry
assessed for property taxation separately from the other interest or
interests in the fee simple absolute. If the tax so assessed against the
right of entry is not paid by the last day upon which it may be paid
without interest or penalty, the nonpayment of the tax shall operate
as a release of the right of entry to the person seised of the present
freehold estate, subject to the unpaid tax and interest and penalties
due thereon, which release shall extinguish the right of entry.
V. In the absence of other persuasive evidence of value pre-
sented to the assessor, it shall be presumed, for the purposes of III
and IV, that a possibility of reverter or a right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent on a fee simple is worth one tenth of the value
of the unencumbered fee simple absolute.
VI. A person seised of a freehold estate in land shall be entitled
to have legal reversions, remainders and executory interests in the
land assessed for property taxation separately from the other interest
or interests in the fee simple absolute. If the tax so assessed against
the reversions, remainders and executory interests is not paid by the
last day upon which it may be paid without interest or penalty, the
non-payment of the tax shall operate as a release of any and all legal
reversions, remainders and executory interests in the land to the per-
son seised of the present freehold estate, subject to the unpaid tax and
penalties due thereon, upon trust for the benefit of all persons with
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present or future interests in the land." 4
VII. In the absence of other persuasive evidence of value pre-
sented to the assessor it shall be presumed, for the purposes of VI,
that any and all legal reversions, remainders and executory interests
are worth, in the aggregate, forty percent of the value of the unen-
cumbered fee simple absolute.
VIII. A person seised of a freehold estate in land who becomes
trustee of the land by virtue of VI shall have power to sell, exchange,
mortgage or lease all or any portion of or interest in the land, to grant
options for purchase, exchange, mortgage or lease and to make all
conveyances necessary to effectuate such transactions, which options,
mortgages, leases and conveyances shall override the equitable rever-
sions, remainders and executory interests therein, subject to the fol-
lowing provisions:
A. Any sale or exchange shall be for an adequate consid-
eration in money or money's worth, and any portion of the purchase
price not paid at or before the execution of the conveyance shall be
secured by mortgage or other security upon the land.
B. Land received in exchange shall be held upon the same
trusts .as the land exchanged.
.C. Money or securities constituting all or part of the con-
sideration for a sale or exchange, including royalties paid under a
mineral, gas or oil lease, shall be paid or transferred by the purchaser
to a corporation authorized to act as trustee which is not, and is not
controlled by, the person theretofore seised, upon trust for the holders
of present and future interests in the land as their interests existed
prior to the sale or exchange.
D. Money lent on any mortgage made by the person seised
shall be paid by the mortgagee to a like corporation, upon trust as
under C. The corporate trustee, if it deems it in the interest of the
beneficiaries of the trust, may apply the proceeds of such a mortgage,
at the request of the person seised, toward discharge of encum-
brances on the mortgaged land, or to: the cost of making improve-
164. Unlike the English legislation of 1925, this proposal does not solve expressly the
problem of unmerchantability of title caused by the existence of powers of appointment. Per-
haps it should. Those who take by virtue of the exercise of such a power do so, however, by
way of executory interest and a conveyance under the powers conferred by VIII should override
their interests. Hole v. Escott, 4 My. & Cr. 187, 41 Eng. Rep. 74 (1838); SIMES & SMIITH § 915.
That is, although such a power could be exercised after the person seised conveyed the fee
simple absolute under the powers conferred by VIII, the appointment would affect only the
proceeds of sale in the hands of the corporate trustee (VIII C.), not the land sold.
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ments, including the erection or alteration of buildings, to the
mortgaged land.
E. A lease, other than a mineral, oil or gas lease, shall be
for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years. Evefy lease shall reserve
a full and adequate rent or provide for payment of adequate royalties.
IX. If, after any legal reversion, remainder or executory interest
has become a beneficial interest under a trust by the operation of VI,
an event occurs which would have caused such legal reversion, re-
mainder or executory interest to become a present freehold estate but
for the operation of VI, the reversion, remainder or executory interest
shall become a legal present freehold estate, subject to any sale,
exchange, mortgage, lease, option or conveyance made under the
powers conferred by VIII.
This legislation would not, unfortunately, enable Hanoch, Phallu,
Hesron and Charmi Clay to convey a merchantable title to Ashland
by October 1, 1972. Its prompt enactment would, however, enable
them to do so within a few years, with lasting benefit to themselves,
their descendants and the people of Clayton and Clay County.
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